

JFK RECORDS

v09-16-96ccr

Cross Reference: None

Status in System:

RT Status: Status 2: Ready for Supervisor Review

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10141-10210
RECORD SERIES : CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 13-09-03
Other Agency Equity: None

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM : CIA
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 03/15/78
PAGES : 15
DOCUMENT TYPE : NOTES
SUBJECT(S) : MEXICO CITY; PHOTOGRAPHS AND FILMS; CIA, FILES;
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN PART
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/01/95
COMMENTS : Box 5

Released under the John
F. Kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992
(44 USC 2107 Note).
Case#:NW 53080 Date:
05-31-2017

Date in: 01/26/96

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Summary OF CI soft file on the
unidentified man photographs.

prepared by DAN HARDWAY

3/15/78

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CI Soft File on MMM photo.

1. Blind memo dated 5/5/77:
"As a result of a detailed search of old records forwarded to Washington from Mexico City, three of the original reports of the "Unidentified man" were located. According to these records, the man visited the Soviet Embassy on 2 October 1963 (not 1 October as reported in Mexis-6453 of 8 October 1963) from 1216 to 1222 hours (local time) and on 4 October 1963 from 1115 to 1132 hours.
1/ The same man visited the Cuban Consulate at 1115 hours on 15 October 1963. 2/ The records contain negatives of five frames of photographs. Prints from two of these frames were sent to Headquarters as a part of the Station file on Oswald because this man was mistakenly linked to the Oswald investigation before it was known that Oswald had left Mexico

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City before this man went to the Soviet Embassy. The three additional frames will be printed and filed with the other photographs in 201-289248 Mexico file but these photographs add no new information.

2. Photographs of the unidentified man were provided by three separate unilateral sources. The original records were located for two of these sources. (This is a report for 2, 4, and 15 October 1963). The other records are believed to have been destroyed in Mexico since the original file folders were located and had been re-used for more recent records. 3/

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2. Blind, undated memo regarding the delay in sending the first cable about Oswald.

"1.... It was discussed in Dave Phillips book as a ~~result~~ case of laziness on the part of the Soviet case officer (which in my view was unjust and unnecessary and indicates that Dave ~~Phillips~~ didn't know what he was talking about)

2. Normally, the Spanish transcript for the 1 October conversation would have been picked up on the morning of the 2nd of October. The Russian language portion would have gone to the Russian/English transcriber on the 3rd of October. The translation would have been returned the following day (4th) at which time, the Soviet case officer would have asked for the photographic coverage. That coverage would not have been in the station before the 7th since the film

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was still in the camera on the 3rd of October and it was picked up probably on the 4th, processed and passed to the Station on the next work day which would have been Monday 7 October.

3. Later the film was taken out of the camera every day but at that time, the film stayed in the camera until a full roll was completed which might take three or four days.

4. A name trace could have been requested on the basis of the name alone but that wasn't the way Min Scott ran that Station. He wanted the photographic coverage tied in with the telephone coverage.... It was also part of the 'numbers game' of justifying a project by the number of dispatches, cables, or reports produced."

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3. Log of Film #744; Tuesday, 1 October; Coverage 900 to 1900; also gives Camera Setting & weather designation. This log also covers the 2nd & 3rd of October. It is in Spanish (Sovemb pictures).
4. Log Film 145, October 4, 1963
In Spanish; Sovemb pictures
5. Log from Cubemb photos
Film #260 10/15/63. Log is in English. The entry in the log about the MMR says: "Man; sent to the Consulate"
6. Memo (blind) dated 5/2/77
"1. On 2 May 1977, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] visited the [REDACTED] Records Center to review old Mexico City files in search of additional photographs of the "unidentified man". We were unable to locate any such photographs. It appears that earlier photographs may have been destroyed in a purge of Mexico City Station files and that the folders for the destroyed

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material were re-used to forward more recent photographic material to Headquarters for retention.... Dispatch HMMT 11,368, dated 17 March 1972. Photos were filed in re-used subject and "P" folders (equivalent of subject 201 folders) indicating contents of original 'subject'. an 'P' files were destroyed. Ref (to previous shipment) HMMA 40,562, 21 May 1971."

7. Blind; undated memo entitled "Mexico Station Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies (1963)":

a. There were three photo coverage sites on the Soviet Embassy. One was directly across the street from the Soviet gate. The second covered the backyard of the Soviet compound. The third was a backup position for the first one. The first base was closed when the station learned that the Warren

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Commission was going to publish a copy of the M M M photograph.

b. These three bases were managed by an agent ~~XXXXXX~~

~~XXXXXX~~. He collected the film from the two main bases three times a week. The film was then developed and printed onto 8X10 contact print sheets by another recruited outside agent.

c. ~~The Embassy~~ Station clearly had a unilateral telephone surveillance operation on the Soviet Embassy prior to 1958. In that year the Mexicans proposed a joint operation ^{WHICH WAS INSTALLED.} ~~The American~~ taps were removed to prevent their discovery by the Mexicans when they put their taps in. It is unclear to me whether the unilateral taps were reactivated.

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d. In 1961 the COS became the case officer for the Mexican/American intercept operation. Another station officer assisted in daily supervision and picked up the tapes and transcripts. There was also an American technician at the listening post.

e. In mid-1962 the Mexican authorities asked for the phone numbers of the Cuban, Soviet and Satellite Embassies. [The CIA Station then disconnected all of their unilateral taps so they would not be discovered by the Mexicans when they put in their taps.] The Mexicans did put in taps on 5 Soviet & 5 Cuban lines. A live monitor at the listening post made short summaries of the conversations which were given to the COS daily. Full transcripts were typed & given to the Station after the reads.

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were completed, usually within a day or two long E. reels and Russian were taken to [REDACTED] for translation, "the translations usually ran about a week behind the date of the conversation."

g. "As soon as the Station learned that an American identifying himself as Lee Oswald phoned the Soviet Embassy, [REDACTED] ^{EA/6cc} of the Station started screening all photographs. However, here again, there was a backlog because the photographs were picked up three times a week but those picked up were usually for dates a few days before since the technician who was processing the film did so on a night-time basis. Further, photographs were not made initially until a complete roll of film was used. Later this was changed and the operator cleared the camera

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at the end of each day regardless of amount of unused film remaining. The instructions were to cover the entire workday (office hours) and to photograph all Soviets, their families, all foreigners, and cars with foreign license plates. Human error did occur but generally the agents were conscientious. The Cuban Embassy coverage had more sophisticated equipment using a [REDACTED] camera which frequently developed mechanical difficulties.

Oswald came to the attention of the listening post operators from a tap of the Soviet line. It was picked up and taken to [REDACTED] for translation because the caller was trying to speak in Russian. There was some delay because Station personnel wanted to compare the photographs

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with the typed transcript."

8. There are several cables and memos about a tentative identification of the MMM as one of "Yuriy Ivanovich Moskalov", a KGB officer.

9. 10 Feb 77. "Notes made by [redacted] Employee
[redacted] for [redacted] Employee
[redacted] IG Staff"

a. the three photo sites were handled by [redacted]

He collected the film and his brother-in-law printed it.

b. the inside IG was [redacted]

Delitz

b. the agents used in the unilateral phone taps were [redacted] and [redacted]

c. [redacted] was a TSD officer who was put inside the listening post to maintain the equipment. [redacted] Employee met with him daily to pick

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12.

d. Personnel assignments

COS: Min Scott

DCOS: [REDACTED] (6/63-9/65)

CA: David Phillips (9/61-3/64)

Cust

(8/62-9/64)

Cuba Ops: [REDACTED] Chief

(4/63 - 4/65)

(9/63 - 7/65)

(10/63 - 5/65)

Dave Phillips Chief

$$(8/63 - 6/65)$$

Soviet target: ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ (9/59-8/65)

(11.11.11)

$$(5/64 - 7/64)$$

Outside CO (6/62-1/67)

Support Assets

Unilat. Phone tap: [REDACTED] (2/60-10/60)

Outside CO: ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

49-71

UNILAT Photo Cubans:

615-9-4164

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Soviet Unilat. Photo:

[REDACTED] 6/58-6/63

[REDACTED] 6/63-10/64

Liaison phone taps:

[REDACTED] 62-68

[REDACTED] 61-71

~~Liaison~~

Liaison surveillance:

12/62-9/67

TSD Outside Unit

[REDACTED] 4/58-12/63.

~~Employee~~

2. [REDACTED] took the reel to [REDACTED] who would then get it to the [REDACTED].

- 10 Memorandum prepared by Raymond Rocco for the Rockefeller Commission:
 "Intelligence did not provide a photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald during his brief stay in Mexico City that month."

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" At no time during his stay in Mexico City did the CIA acquire a photo of Oswald. A careful review of all coverage was conducted on 22 and 23 November 1963 after the assassination, including materials back to August 1963. This confirmed that there was no CIA photo coverage of Oswald at any time during his Mexico trip or stay in Mexico City. Moreover, although it had made a cabled request on 15 October, the CIA's Mexico representative had no photo of Oswald in his records, nor did he receive one from Headquarters - which did not have one either - before 22 November 1963. "

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